Abstract. In 2011, Waters presented a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption protocol that uses bilinear pairings to provide control access mechanisms, where the set of user's attributes is specified by means of a linear secret sharing scheme. Some of the applications foreseen for this protocol lie in the context of mobile devices such a smartphones and tablets, which in a majority of instances are powered by an ARM processor supporting the NEON vector set of instructions. In this paper we present the design of a software cryptographic library that implements a 127-bit security level attribute-based encryption scheme over mobile devices equipped with a 1.4GHz Exynos 4 Cortex-A9 processor and a developing board that hosts a 1.7 GHz Exynos 5 Cortex-A15 processor. For the latter platform and taking advantage of the inherent parallelism of the NEON vector instructions, our library computes a single optimal pairing over a Barreto-Naehrig curve approximately 2 times faster than the best timings previously reported on ARM platforms at this level of security. Further, using a 6-attribute access formula our library is able to encrypt/decrypt a text/ciphertext in less than 4.49mS and 15.67mS, respectively.
Introduction
It was long assumed that the task of computing a single bilinear pairing was rather expensive, so much so that when assessing the complexity of a given protocol, a designer could safely ignore the computational cost of all the other cryptographic components. Nevertheless, in the last few years we have witnessed a dramatic reduction in the timing required to calculate a single pairing, which has had the side effect that the computation of the other ancillary functions associated to pairing-based protocols have acquired a renewed importance. Some examples of these auxiliary blocks include, fixed/variable point scalar multiplication for elliptic curves defined over finite fields and their extensions, the projection of arbitrary strings to a random point in those elliptic curves, exponentiation in field extensions, etc. Furthermore, as pointed out in [8, 20] , several pairing-based protocols admit further optimizations, such as the computation of fixed-argument pairings and products of pairings.
Unfortunately as of today, very few works have analyzed in detail the complexity and overall computational weight of non-pairing cryptographic operations in a given protocol. This lack of research in the implementation of pairingbased protocols is especially acute for mobile platforms such as the ones using ARM processors.
An important number of major IT players such as Apple, Samsung, Sony, to name just a few, have adopted the ARM Cortex family of processors for powering their tablets, smartphones and other mobile devices. A majority of those devices support the vector set of instructions NEON [6] . In spite of their ever increasing popularity, it is only until recently that some research works have studied the implementation of cryptographic primitives over ARM processor platforms.
Among the research papers reporting pairing implementations in the ARM Cortex family of processors are [1] and [13] . In [1] , the authors advocate the use of affine coordinates could be more attractive than the projective ones when implementing pairings in constrained devices, whereas the software library of [13] reports the current record in the computation of a single asymmetric pairing at the 128, 224 and 320-bit security levels. As for the implementation of pairingbased protocols on mobile devices, the only work that we are aware of is [2] , where the authors described the design of an attribute-based encryption scheme able to preserve the confidentiality of the medical electronic records generated within a hospital environment.
In this work we present the design of a software library that implements Waters' attribute-based encryption scheme [21] , over a set of mobile device platforms equipped with the latest models of the ARM Cortex family of processors and the vectorized set of instructions NEON. Our library was specifically tailored for computing optimal pairings over Barreto-Naehrig curves at the 127-bit security level. When executed on a developing board that hosts a 1.7 GHz Exynos 5 Cortex-A15 processor, our software computes a single optimal pairing in approximately 5.82M clock cycles, which is about two times less than the estimated cycling count reported in [13] for a single pairing computation over a TI 1.2GHz OMAP 4460 Cortex-A9 processor.
Our library also implements single/multi-pairing computations with fixed/-variable input points, as well as other auxiliary functions associated with most pairing-based protocols such as scalar multiplication and the projection of arbitrary strings to elliptic curve points defined over extension finite fields, among others. In particular, when executed on the Cortex-A15 processor mentioned above and when using an access formula composed of six attributes, our library computes the encryption/decryption primitives of Waters' attribute-based encryption protocol in less than 7.63M clock cycles and 26.64M clock cycles, roughly equivalent to 4.49mS and 15.67mS, respectively.
Let p be a prime, and let E be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field F p . Let r be a prime with r | #E(F p ) and gcd(r, p) = 1. The embedding degree k is the smallest positive integer such that r | (p k − 1). In this paper, only the BarretoNaehrig (BN) pairing-friendly family of elliptic curves [5] were considered for pairing implementation. All BN curves have embedding degree k = 12 and they are defined by the equation E :
where the characteristic p of the prime field, the group order r, and the trace of Frobenius t are parametrized as,
r(z) = 36z 4 + 36z 3 + 18z 2 + 6z + 1;
where z ∈ Z is an arbitrary integer known as the BN parameter, and where p(z) and r(z) are prime numbers. BN curves admit a sextic twist curve, defined as
be the p-th power Frobenius endomorphism. The trace of the Frobenius is defined as
, where G 1 is the 1-eigenspace of π acting on E[r]. Let Ψ :Ẽ → E be the associated twisting isomorphism. LetQ ∈Ẽ(F p 2 ) be a point of order r; then Q = Ψ (Q) ∈ E(F p ). The group G 2 = Q is the peigenspace of π acting on E[r]. Let G T denote the order-r subgroup of F * p 12 [3] . The bilinear pairing studied in this paper is defined as the non-degenerate map a opt : G 2 × G 1 → G T , corresponding to the optimal ate pairing defined as:
where f s,Q is a Miller function of length s = 6z + 2, which is a rational function
, while Q1,Q2 is the line equation given by the point addition of Q 1 ∈ G 2 and Q 2 ∈ G 2 . Algorithm 1 computes the optimal pairing as defined in Eq. (2).
Tower Extension Field Arithmetic
Efficient arithmetic over extension finite fields is a necessary requirement in the development of high-performance pairing-based schemes. In this work, we represent F p 12 using the same tower extension employed in [4] , namely, we first construct a quadratic extension, which is followed by a quadratic and cubic extensions of it and finally by a quadratic one, using the following irreducible binomials,
Algorithm 1 Optimal ate pairing
Require: P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 Ensure: g =âopt(Q, P ) 1: Write s = 6z+2 as s =
else if si = −1 then
end if 10: end for 11:
Furthermore, as in [4] we selected z = −(2 62 + 2 55 + 1), which using Eq. 1 yields a prime p ≡ 3 mod 4. This allows for a faster arithmetic over F p 2 , since the multiplication by the constant β reduces to a simple subtraction. For the computation of the pairing final exponentiation, cyclotomic subgroup arithmetic G Φ6 (F p 2 ) [12] was extensively used. The single most important base field arithmetic operation is modular multiplication, which is defined as c = a · b mod p, with a, b, c ∈ F p . Since in general BN primes are not suitable for fast reductions, this operation was performed via the Montgomery multiplication algorithm. The Montgomery product is defined as,c =ã ·b · r −1 mod p, whereã,b ∈ F p are given as,ã = a · r mod p and b = b · r mod p, respectively. This formulation allows trading the costly division by p with divisions by r, where r = 2 k with k − 1 < |p| < k. If required, the modular product c, can be easily recovered using c =c·r −1 mod p. Algorithm 2 shows the classical version of the Montgomery product, which expects as input parameter an integer p that can be precomputed before hand using Bezout's identity for two co-prime integers, namely, r · r −1 − p · p = 1.
Algorithm 2 Montgomery product
In our library both, the Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) and the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) multi-precision Montgomery product variants as described in [17] were implemented. The SOS method computes first the integer product t = a · b, followed by the Montgomery reduction step that calculates u such that u = (t + m · p)/r, where m = t · p (mod r). In this case r = 2 ωn , where ω is the wordsize of the processor and n = [( log 2 p + 1)/ω]. The CIOS method interleaves the calculations corresponding to the integer product with the ones required for getting u. Since in both methods, the reduction is implemented word by word, then the operation m = t · p mod r can be performed replacing p by p 0 = p mod 2 ω , which redounds in a more efficient computation. According to [17] , the CIOS variant is more efficient than the SOS one. Nevertheless, the later method allows lazy reduction, which was the reason why we implemented both variants.
Extension field arithmetic computational cost
Denote by (a, m, s, i) and (ã,m,s,ĩ) the computational cost of the addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations over F p and F p 2 , respectively. The field arithmetic procedures used in this work extensively exploits lazy reduction, which closely resembles the approaches adopted in [4, 13] . Letm E ,s E andr E denote integer multiplication, integer squaring and reduction over F p 2 , respectively, wherem =m E +r E ands =s E +r E . The rationale behind the costs given in Table 1 , can be summarized as follows.
The cost of reductions over F p 2 is twice the cost of reduction over F p , i.e., r E = 2r E . At a field extension
i 6 j integer multiplications and 2 i 3 j reductions modulo p (Theorem 1 of [4] ). Field inversion was based on the procedure described in [13] . In the case of the quadratic and twelfth field extensions F p 2 and F p 12 , field squaring was computed using the complex method at a cost of 2 multiplications. The inversion of an element A = a 0 + a 1 u ∈ F p 2 was obtained through the identity (a 0 + a 1 u)
. In F p 4 the squaring was implemented at a cost of 3s. This operation is required for computing squarings in the cyclotomic group G Φ6 (F p 2 ), having a cost of 3 squarings over F p 4 . The asymmetric squaring formula for cubic extensions of [7] was used in the field F p 6 at a cost of 2m + 3s. Inversion in F p 6 has a computational complexity of 9m + 3s + i [15] . Notice that m ξ stands for a multiplication by the constant ξ.
Field arithmetic implementation using NEON
The performance of a field arithmetic library is strongly influenced by the processor micro-architecture features, the size of the operands and the algorithms and programming techniques associated to them. In our case, the size of the operands is of 254 bits, which conveniently allows the usage of lazy reduction. The word size in the ARM processors is of 32 bits and the processors considered in this work include the NEON vector set of instructions. uint64x2 t vmull u32 (uint32x2 t, uint32x2 t); uint64x2 t vmlal u32 (uint64x2 t, uint32x2 t, uint32x2 t).
The first one performs two 32-bit integer multiplications storing the corresponding result into two 64-bit registers. The second one performs a multiplication that is accumulated with the addition of a 64-bit scalar. Algorithm 3 illustrates the usage of NEON for computing the double integer product 
Algorithm 3 Computing double integer product with NEON
end for 8:
return F, G
10: end for
Because of their ability to perform two multiplications at once, NEON instructions are very useful for accelerating arithmetic computations. However, data loading and storing is in general costly since the NEON registers have to be fed by storing data into consecutive 32-bit ARM registers. Hence, in order to take a real advantage of NEON, load/store instructions should be avoided as much as possible, which is easier to accomplish if the arithmetic algorithms are specified with little data dependency among the multiplier operands. In the case of F p 2 arithmetic, two independent multiplications over F p were implemented using NEON as follows. Let us consider |p| = 254 bits and define the following three functions: mul N EON , mule N EON and red N EON . The first one performs two independent multiplications in F p using the CIOS method, i.e. given a, b, c
where |G| = |F | = 508 bits. Finally, the third function red N EON implements the Montgomery reduction defined as (f, g) ← red N EON (F, G), where f, g ∈ F p and |G| = |F | = 512 bits. Making use of the aforementioned functions, Algorithms 4 and 5 compute a multiplication and a squaring in F p 2 , respectively. Notice that In step 4 of Alg. 4 the function mul256 stands for a single integer multiplication.
Elliptic curve arithmetic
Elliptic curve points were representing using projective Jacobian coordinates, where a BN elliptic curve E is given as
, with Z 1 = 0. The point at infinity O is represented as (1, 1, 0), whereas the additive inverse of (X 1 :
Point doubling. Given P = (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ), the point 2P = (X 3 : Y 3 : Z 3 ) can be calculated with 4 squarings and 3 multiplications according to the next sequence of operations,
Y 2 : 1), for P = ±Q, the addition R = P + Q = (X 3 : Y 3 : Z 3 ) can be obtained at a cost of 3 squarings and 8 multiplications according to the next sequence,
Taking advantage of the inherent parallelism of the above sequences, a NEON implementation of the point addition and point doubling operations is shown in Algorithms 6 and 7, respectively.
Scalar Multiplication
The elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation computes the multiple R = [ ]P , with ∈ Z r , P, R ∈ E(F p ), which corresponds to the point resulting of Algorithm 6 Point doubling with Jacobian coordinates
Algorithm 7 Mixed point addition
Require: P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) and Q = (X2 : Y2 : 1) ∈ G1 Ensure:
adding P to itself times. The average cost of computing [ ]P by a random n−bit scalar using the customary double-and-add method is of about, nD+ n 2 A, where A is the cost of a point addition, and D is the cost of a point doubling.
The customary method to speed up this operation reduces the Hamming weight of the scalar by representing it in its non-adjacent form (NAF). The technique can be easily extended to the w-NAF representation, namely, = n−1 i=0 i 2 i , | i | ≤ 2 w−1 , and at most one of any w consecutive digits is non-zero, with n−1 = 0, where the length n is at most one bit larger than the bitsize of the scalar n and the resulting Hamming weight is approximately 1/(w + 1). The estimated cost of the scalar multiplication reduces to, nD + n ω+1 A, plus the cost of the precomputation of the multiples P i = [i]P, for i ∈ [1, 3, . . . , 2 w−1 − 1]. Due to this exponential penalty, in most applications a rather conservative value of w ∈ [3, 5] is selected.
When the point P is fixed, some form of the comb method is usually preferred. Given an w-window size and a known-point P , one can pre-compute for all of the possible bit strings (a w−1 , . . . , a 0 ) the following 2 w multiples of P :
Then, the scalar is scanned column-wise by recoding it into d blocks each one with a bit length of w bits, where d = |r|/w. The computational and storage costs of the comb method is of d(A+D), and a look-up table of 2 w points, respectively. Notice that the storage cost can be reduced to a half by using a signed representation of the scalar , as presented by Hamburg in [14] . A further speedup in the computation of the scalar multiplication can be achieved if there exists an efficientcomputable endomorphism ψ over E/F p such that ψ(P ) = λP [11] . In the case of BN curves, given a cube root of unity β ∈ F p , one has that the mapping D . In the case that the scalar multiplication in G 2 , i.e. the computation of the multiple S = [ ]Q, with ∈ Z r , Q, S ∈ E(F p 2 ), is of interest, one can take advantage of the Frobenius endomorphism to extend the two-dimensional GLV method to a four dimension version using the GS approach [10] . Let E be a BN elliptic curve over F p with embedding degree k = 12 and letẼ(F p 2 ) be the sixth degree twist of E. Let π p be the Frobenius operator in E, then ψ = φ −1 π p φ is an endomorphism onẼ such that ψ :Ẽ(F p 2 ) →Ẽ(F p 2 ). Then for Q ∈Ẽ(F p 2 ), it holds that ψ k (Q) = Q, ψ(Q) = pQ, and ψ satisfies ψ 4 − ψ 2 + 1 = 0. Since p ≡ t − 1 mod r, the scalar can be decomposed as = 0 + 1 λ + 2 λ 2 + 3 λ 3 with λ = t − 1, which allows to compute the scalar multiplication in
, at an approximate cost of
Likewise, in the case of the exponentiation in G T , the operation f e with f ∈ G T , e ∈ Z r can then be accomplished by rewriting the exponent e in base p as, e = e 0 + e 1 · p + e 2 · p 2 + e 3 · p 3 , with |e i | ≈ |p|, followed by the compu-
· f 
Bilinear Pairing Arithmetic
In this section we briefly describe the Miller's loop and final exponentiation computations as well as the algorithm utilized to perform multi-pairing computations.
Miller Loop
The main operations of Algorithm 1 are the evaluation of the tangent line T,T and the doubling of the point T ; as well as the secant line evaluation and the computation of the point addition T + P . The most efficient way to perform above operations is through the usage of standard projective coordinates, where the projective point (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ) in the elliptic curve E corresponds to the affine point (X 1 /Z 1 , Y 1 /Z 1 ). Given the curveẼ/F p 2 defined asẼ : y 2 = x 3 + b whose projective form is Y 2 Z = X 3 + bZ 3 , one can calculate 2T = (X 3 : Y 3 : Z 3 ) ∈ E (F p 2 ) using the formulas [4] :
whereas the tangent line T,T evaluated on P = (x P , y P ) ∈ E(F p ) is given as,
In the same way, given the points
and P = (x P , y P ) ∈ E(F p ) one can calculate the point addition R = T + Q = (X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 ) and T,Q (P ) as [4] :
T,Q (P ) = λy P − θx P w + (θX 2 − λY 2 )w 3 ,
Another important aspect of the Miller's algorithm is the multiplication of the Miller variable f by the line (either tangent or secant) evaluation. However, the evaluation of the lines Q,Q and T,Q produce a sparse element in the group F * p 12 with half of its coefficients having a zero value, which motivates the idea that any product of f ∈ F p 12 with Q,Q or T,Q should be performed using a procedure specially tailored for computing sparse multiplications.
Final Exponentiation
The exponent e = (p k − 1)/r in the BN final exponentiation can be broken into two parts as, [9] , which allowed a lower number of operations. Using the BN parameter z, the exponentiation of g d (z) requires the calculation of the following addition chain,
which requires 3 exponentiations by z, 3 squarings an one multiplication over F p 12 . Finally, given the variables a = g
is calculated as follows:
Since g ∈ G Φ6 (F p 2 ), the cost of g d (z) is 3 Frobenius operators, 3 exponentiations by z, 10 multiplications in F p 12 and 3 squarings in G Φ6 (F p 2 ). It should be noted that we use the Karabina compressed squaring formulas [16] for performing the exponentiation-by-z step.
Multipairing Products of pairings are part of the required computations in the ABE protocol. For this, one can make use of the pairing bilinear property to group pairings sharing one of the input parameters. If all the pairings share a common input point, then one can exchange n pairing products by n − 1 point additions and a single pairing using the identity, n−1 i=0 e(Q, P i ) = e(Q,
If a product of pairings is still needed, and the previous method was already exploited, there is still room for obtaining significant speedups. For instance, one can compute this product by performing a multi-pairing (or simultaneous product of pairings), by exploiting the well-known techniques employed in the multi-exponentiation setting. In essence, in a multipairing computation not only the costly final exponentiation step can be shared, but also, one can share both the Miller variable f, and the squaring computations performed in the step 4 of Algorithm 1. A further performance improvement can be achieved if the point Q in G 2 is known in advance, since in this case one can pre-compute some of the line evaluation operations, which allows to compute the lines on the point P ∈ G 1 as, , (P ) = l 0 y P + l 1 x P w + l 2 w 3 . Algorithm 8 computes the product of n optimal BN pairings as discussed above.
Algorithm 8 Multipairing for BN curves
Require: P1, P2, . . . , Pn ∈ G1, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn ∈ G2 Ensure: g= 
else if sj = −1 then 13: 
22: return g
Attribute Based-Encryption
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a relatively new encryption scheme where an identity is seen as a set of attributes. In this scheme a user can access to some resources only if she had a set of privileges (called attributes) satisfying a control access policy previously defined. The policy is described through a boolean formula, which can be represented by an access structure and can be implemented using a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) [19, 21] . The LSSS structure is described by the pair (M, ρ), where M ∈ F r is an u × t matrix, where u, t are the number of required attributes and the access policy threshold, respectively; whereas ρ is a label function that according to the policy links each row of the matrix M to an attribute. For the sake of efficiency and as Scott did in [20] , we reformulate the protocol from its original symmetric setting to an asymmetric one where some scheme parameters are conveniently defined in G 1 whereas others are in G 2 . The ABE scheme is made up of four algorithms [21] : Setup, Encrypt, Key Generation y Decrypt, as described next. Setup This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the set of U attributes. The security parameter becomes the main criterion to select the groups G 1 and G 2 of order r and the generators P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 . The points H 1 , . . . , H U ∈ G 1 are generated from the attribute universe and the algorithm also chooses two random integers a, α ∈ F r . The public key is published as, PK = {P, Q, e(Q, P ) α , [a]P, H 1 , . . . , H U }. Additionally, the authority establishes MSK = [α]P as her master secret key. This algorithm has a cost of one pairing, two scalar multiplications and U MapToPoint functions. Notice that it is assumed that the elements P , Q, [a]P and e(Q, P ) α are all known in advance. On the contrary, the points H 1 , . . . H U were not considered as fixed points since the attribute universe has a variable length, a fact that is also reflected in the storage cost. Encrypt The algorithm for encryption takes as input the public key PK, the message M to be encrypted, and the LSSS access structure (M, ρ), where M ∈ F r is an u×t matrix as described above. The algorithm starts by randomly selecting a column vector v = (s, y 2 , . . . , y t )
T ∈ F n r that will be used to securely share the secret exponent s. For i = 1 to u, it calculates λ i = M i · v where M i is the 1 × t vector corresponding to the i-th row of M . The scalars r 1 , . . . , r u ∈ F r are also randomly chosen. Then, the cipher CT is published as follows:
which is sent along with the LSSS access structure (M, ρ). The comb method was applied to compute scalar multiplications involving the fixed points Q, P and [a]P . In the same way, one can apply this method to obtain the powering of e(Q, P ) α by the exponent s. The GLV method was used to compute scalar multiplications with the points H i ∈ G 1 . Hence the cost of encryption is one multiplication and one fixed exponentiation in G T , u fixed point multiplications in G 1 , u + 1 fixed point multiplications in G 2 and u point multiplication in G 1 .
Key Generation This algorithm takes as input the master secret key MSK = αP and a set of attributes S. First the algorithm selects a random number t ∈ F r , then it generates the attribute-based private key as follows,
Let N be the number of attributes on S, since the points aP and Q are known, the cost of this algorithm is one fixed point multiplication in G 1 , one fixed point in G 2 and N point multiplications in G 1 . For the first two scalar multiplications the comb method was used, and the GLV method for the rest. Decrypt This algorithm takes as inputs the cipher CT with the access structure (M, ρ) and the private key SK for a set S. Suppose S satisfies the access structure and define I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , u} as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ω i ∈ Z} i∈I be the set of constants such that if λ i is a valid share of a secret s according to M , then i∈I ω i λ i = ∆s with ∆ ∈ F r . The decryption algorithm first computes:
Followed by the multiplication of this value by C as defined in Eq. (3). If S satisfies the access structure this should recover the message M.
The variable ∆ guarantees low size constants ω i , i.e., | ω i |< 64 bits, which allows us to perform the scalar multiplications involving these constants using an ω-NAF method. We called this operation short scalar multiplication. Let N < u be the number of elements of I, then the computational cost of Eq. (3) is of 2N short multiplications in G 1 , an N + 2 multipairing computation, N point additions in G 1 and one exponentiation in G T which can be computed using the GS method. Also, since L ∈ G 2 is a known point, its lines evaluations were precomputed.
Implementation Results
This section presents our main implementation results classified into three subsections: bilinear pairings, scalar multiplication and the ABE scheme timings.
Pairing costs
The total cost of the pairing is split into two parts: the Miller Loop and the final exponentiation. In the case of the Miller Loop, Table 2 shows the estimated cost of its main operations.
The length of the optimal pairing Miller loop in Alg. 1 is s = 6z + 2. Choosing the BN parameter as z = −2 62 − 2 55 − 1 implies that the signed binary representation of s has a length of 65 bits with a Hamming weight of 5. Hence, the total cost of the Miller Loop is: M.L. = 238m + 266s + 1694m E + 126s E + 875r E + 588m ξ + 8739ã + 288m
Operation Cost Sparse Multiplication f · , (P ) 13mE + 6rE + 3m ξ + 50ã Doubling and line evaluation.
3m + 4s + 2sE + 1rE + 19ã + 4m
T,T (P ) y 2T Adding and line evaluation.
7m + 2s + 4mE + 2rE + 10ã + 4m As for the final exponentiation step, we estimate the cost of the exponentiation by z over F p 12 as, 9m + 378s + 36m E + 12r E + 204m ξ + 1704ã +ĩ, which implies that the cost of the final exponentiation is approximately, E.F. = 38m + 1161s + 346m E + 9s E + 121r E + 721m ξ + 8m + 6442ã + 4ĩ
In the case of the multipairing computation, we observe that when n = 1, its cost is equivalent to a pairing, whereas for n > 1 we have that for each extra pairing the final exponentiation and the cost of the squaring in the Miller Loop is saved as shown in Table 3 .
# Pairings
Appr. Cost in F p 2 Appr. cost in Fp single pairing 280m + 1436s + 2148mE + 135sE+ 10652m + 32968a + 4i +996rE + 1309m ξ + 15175ã + 288m + 4ĩ each extra pairing 238m + 266s + 938mE + 126sE + 497rE+ 4474m + 9954 210m ξ + 4767ã + 288m each extra 910mE + 420rE + 210m ξ + 3500ã + 280m 2100m + 7420a fixed point pairing Table 3 . Costs of the multipairing computation Table 4 presents a comparison against the works [1] and [13] . In [1] a pairing library using affine coordinates was presented, whereas [13] reports an assembler optimized pairing library using standard projective coordinates. Notice that the authors in [13] did not consider the usage of NEON. Table 5 shows the timings obtained for the computation of scalar multiplication in G 1 and G 2 , and field exponentiation in the group G T . Scalar multiplication using w-NAF only was employed for small 64-bit scalars, with w = 3. The comb method was the choice for computing fixed point scalar multiplication with a window size of w = 8. We stress that the w-NAF was used in combination with both the GLV and GS methods. 3 
Costs of the scalar multiplication and field exponentiation

Attribute-based encryption costs
We could not compare our ABE scheme timings against [2] , because this work only implements the decryption algorithm and it does not presents the exact timings. Table 6 reports the timings obtained when a 6-attribute policy is employed in the ABE protocol. Note that for the decryption algorithm we present the cases when ∆ = 1 and ∆ > 1 (see Eq. 3).
Conclusion
We presented a cryptographic library that implements Waters' attribute encryption scheme in mobile devices operated with ARM processors. The main primitives developed were bilinear pairings and scalar multiplications in different flavors. Our library uses four different scalar multiplications according to the group, scalar size and the type of the point (either fixed or variable), providing a 127-bit security level and achieving record timings for the computation of a single bilinear pairing at this level of security when implemented on the Exynos-5 Cortex-A15 processor. A key factor that helps us to achieve faster timings than previously reported works was the usage of the NEON technology that allows a better exploitation of the inherent parallelism present in several field and elliptic curve arithmetic operations. It is illustrative to analyze the Exynos-4 scalar multiplication timings shown in Table 5 . where NEON produces savings of about 14%, 30% and 15% in the computations over the G 1 , G 2 and G T groups, respectively. Notice that the significant better performance of NEON in the computations over G 2 are a consequence of the rich parallelism extracted for the field squaring and multiplication over F p 2 as it was explained in Section 4.
Another interesting aspect to remark is the performance comparison of our work against [13] for the single pairing computation at the 127 bit security level. As shown in Table 4 , without using NEON, the two libraries perform essentially the same when implemented in the Tegra 2 and Apple A5 processors, respectively. However, taking advantage of NEON, our library outperforms the library in [13] by approximately 20% when implemented in the Exynos 4 and TI OMAP processors, respectively. Moreover, when deployed in the Exynos 5 processor, our library computes a bilinear pairing 40% faster than our Exynos 4 processor implementation; and performs a bit more than two times faster than the software in [13] .
The Cortex A-15 micro-architecture is equipped with an out-of-order superscalar pipeline, a lower latency level-2 cache unit and an improved NEON unit that according to the manufacturer's documentation is expected to "...deliver over five times the performance of today's advanced smartphones" [18] .
The experimental results presented in this paper lead us to conclude that the Cortex A-15 micro-architecture and its improved NEON unit indeed offer a significantly superior performance when implementing cryptographic applications. Because of that, any future developments of pairing-based protocols on ARM processors should not omit the redesign of the (extension) field and elliptic curve arithmetic procedures so that the parallelism offered by the NEON set of instructions can be effectively used.
